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Jacques van der Gaag 
7.1  Introduction 
This chapter addresses the following question: To what extent do the 
payments that households receive from an income maintenance program, 
such as Aid to  Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) or food stamps, 
measure the benefit or the value of these programs to the household? In a 
world where households can always achieve their desired levels of work 
and consumption  and where all the relevant economic constraints are 
known with certainty, it can be shown that these payments will overesti- 
mate or be equal to the value of the program to the household as measured 
by either the equivalent or compensating measure of variation. This result 
is due to the manner in which all income maintenance schemes compute 
their payments. Since the payment is designed to decline as the household 
income rises, the price of leisure (work) is distorted from its market price 
(the gross wage rate). This distortion, not unlike the effects of the tax rate 
in the theory of positive taxation, produces a “wedge” between the value 
the household places on the program and the payment the government 
makes to the household. This wedge, which could be considered the dead- 
weight loss to society (to borrow a concept from the evaluation of the 
positive taxation),  measures the excess payment that the government 
makes to the household over the payment the government would have to 
make if the payment was given in a lump-sum manner. 
David  Betson  is assistant professor  of economics at the University of Notre  Dame. 
Jacques van der Gaag is an economist in the Development Research Department of the 
World Bank. 
The views expressed in this chapter are the authors’ and do not necessarily reflect those of 
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The purpose of this chapter is to  examine how this conclusion stands up 
when we  abandon the assumption that the household possesses perfect 
knowledge about its employment prospects and potential standard of liv- 
ing. Thus we are interested in the measurement not only of the value of the 
income transfer to the household, but also of the insurance value of the 
program to the household. When factors that reflect uncertainty in the 
household’s future potential standard of living are taken into account, the 
payment or expected payments from an income maintenance scheme will 
tend to  underestimate the value of the program to  the household. 
Section 7.2  will present the methodology underlying the measurement 
of the value of an income maintenance program under the assumptions of 
certainty. Section 7.3 extends the methodology to the situation where the 
household faces an uncertain future, the major factor of  uncertainty being 
the possible limitation placed on the availability of work (unemployment). 
In this section we  evaluate the benefits of a hypothetical income mainte- 
nance program that pays benefits only to unemployed individuals. In sec- 
tion 7.4 we extend the analysis to consider how the valuation of an income 
maintenance program would be affected due to uncertainty in the real- 
wage rate. Here we  also introduce a more realistic program that allows 
transfers to the household as long as its income does not exceed a given level, 
regardless of the household’s employment. In both sections 7.3 and 7.4 we 
will calculate the value of an income maintenance program, using as an ex- 
ample a female-headed household with children. The final section of  the 
chapter offers a summary and discusses the implications of our findings 
for the evaluation of income maintenance and transfer schemes in general. 
7.2  Measurement of the Value to a Household of an Income 
Maintenance Program: The Certainty Case 
To clarify the various issues in the measurement of the value of an in- 
come maintenance program to a household and to simplify the exposition, 
we  abstract from the many complexities of  income transfer schemes as 
they exist today and consider an income maintenance program that can be 
described by the following relationship: 
G -  tz  if Z  < G/t, 
0  if Z  2  G/t, 
(1)  P=  I 
where 
P = the payment the household would receive if it had Z  amount of  in- 
G  = the maximum payment or income guarantee to the household, 
t  = the program’s benefit reduction rate, and, 
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1  = the  household’s  income  from  earnings  and  other  nontransfer 
In order  to further  simplify the analysis,  we  consider  female-headed 
households with children only, thus eliminating the complication of multi- 




w  = the woman’s real-wage rate, 
h  = the hours of work, and, 
Y  = the amount of nontransfer nonemployment income she receives. 
We will also assume that the woman possesses a complete preference or- 
dering over consumption of goods and services purchased in the market 
(X)  and the amount of nonmarket time, leisure (1). This preference order- 
ing will be represented by a real-value utility function; 
u = U(X,  I), 
where U is concave in X and 1, and the marginal utility of X and 1 is posi- 
tive for all values of X and 1.  Let T be equal to the time available to the 
woman to either work in the market or “consume” leisure, (i.e., T = h + 
I).  We  will need the following concepts to develop the methodology to 
measure the value of the program to the household: 
h(w, Y)  = the woman’s labor supply function, 
V(w,  Y)  = the indirect utility function, 
E(w, (I)  = the expenditure (cost) function, 
= {h  such that U(wh + Y,  T -  h)  is maximized}, 
= {the maximum value of Ugiven X  + wl = wT  + Y}, 
= {the minimum Y such that U(X,  l) = U 
andX+ wl = wT+  Y}.’ 
In a world without uncertainty about wages and with a complete choice 
of hours of work, the woman will participate in the income maintenance 
program (i.e., work a number of hours so that her income will qualify her 
for a payment) if her utility level as a participant exceeds her utility level as 
a nonparticipant. Formally, she will not participate if 
V((1 -  t)~  G + (1 - t)Y)  < V(W,  Y); 
she will participate, and receives a payment P,  if 
V((1 -  t)~  G + (1 -  t)Y)  > V(W,  Y), 
1.  Note that our definition of the expenditure function differs slightly from the standard 
textbook presentation. It is more common to define E(w,  U)  as the minimum wT + Yneeded 
to achieve p if the woman faces a real wage of w. But since we will be more concerned with 
the amount of nonemployment income, we use this definition of the expenditure function. 218  David Betson/Jacques van der Gaag 
where 
and 
P=  G -  t(Y + wh) 
h = h((1 -  t)~,  G + (1 - t)Y). 
Thus, a woman who does not participate should give the program a value 
zero, otherwise she would have participated. However, a woman who re- 
ceives a payment must value the program positively, since, by participat- 
ing, she is better off in utility terms. The question we address is: Is the pay- 
ment she receives an appropriate measure of the value she places upon the 
existence of the program? 
Traditional benefit  analysis would  address this issue by  asking the 
woman two alternative questions. First, what would be the maximum 
lump-sum payment she would be willing to make in order to  keep the pro- 
gram in existence? This monetary measure of the program’s value is de- 
noted in the literature as the compensating variation (CV), which can be 
expressed in our notation as 
CVsuch that V((1  -  t)w, G + (1 - t)Y -  CV)  = V(w,  Y). 




CV = (G -  tY)  + E(w, Vo) -  E((1 -  t)~,  Vo) 
= E((1 -  t)w Vl) -  E((1 -  t)w, Vo), 
Vo  = V(w Y), 
VI = V((1  -  t)~,  G + (1 -  t)Y)  . 
Alternatively, we  could ask the woman the question: What is the mini- 
mum lump-sum payment the government would have to make, so that she 
feels indifferent about the program’s existence? This equivalent variation 
(EV)  can be defined using our notation as 




As can be seen from equations (3) and (4), these two approaches attempt 
to  measure, in monetary terms, the distance between the maximum utility 
achievable with the program (  Vl) and the maximum utility achievable 
without the program (  VO).  Each measure utilizes a different price of lei- 
sure to measure this distance. The compensating variation uses (1 -  t)w 
while the equivalent variation measure uses the wage rate, w. 
EV= (G -  tY)  + E(w, Vi) -  E((1 -  t)~  VI), 
= E(w,  V,) -  E(w, Vo). 219  Measuring the Benefits of Income Maintenance Programs 
Given that the compensating and equivalent variations represent the 
monetary value of  the program to the individual, how does the payment 
the woman actually receives compare to these other “true” measures of 
the welfare gain due to the program? Intuition would lead one to conclude 
that, since the payment, P, reflects a labor supply reduction due to both 
income and substitution effects of the program, this payment would tend 
to overestimate the value of the program to the woman.  On the other 
hand, if  one computes the payment the woman would receive if  she had 
chosen to work the same number of hours as she did in the absence of the 
program, then this hypothetical payment, Po, would underestimate the 
true welfare measures. In Appendix A we demonstrate that the above in- 
tuition is correct and that the four measures can be ranked in the follow- 
ing manner: 
PosCVSEVSP. 
In the above discussion we have assumed that the woman is free to work 
her desired level of  hours and that she is not limited in her choice, except 
by budget constraints. We showed that, in this case, the transfer payment 
serves as an upper bound of the value of the program to  the household. We 
also obtained a lower bound, thus defining a range within which the true 
value of the program lies. How would these results change if the woman 
suffers a spell of involuntary unemployment? If she still decides not to 
participate, her evaluation  of the program does not change, i.e.,  it re- 
mains zero. If, however, she participates, the woman will place a value on 
the program which is exactly equal to  the payment she receives. For exam- 
ple, consider a woman who is participating in the program, becomes un- 
employed, and can only find K I  hl hours of work at the gross wage rate, 
w.’  Her payment, P,  will now equal G - tY - twx.  In the absence of  a 
program the woman would also work only Z hours, so the hypothetical 
payment Poalso  equals G -  tY -  twK.  Hence, it follows that 
Po  = CV  = EV  = P . 
Thus, in this case, the benefit value of the program to the involuntarily un- 
employed woman is exactly equal to the transfer. 
7.3  The Value of the Income Maintenance Program When the 
Household Faces Unemployment Uncertainty 
In the previous section we explored how a woman would value the exis- 
tence of an income maintenance program when all the relevant economic 
2.  A woman who, in the absence of involuntary unemployment,-chooses  not to partici- 
pate may opt for participation if her working hours_are restricted (h < ho). If her optimal 
working hours under participation, hi,  are less than h ,  her evaluation would be equal to the 
certainty case in section 7.2. If h < hl,  the value of the benefit again equals the payment. 220  David Betson/Jacques van der Gaag 
constraints, including the occurrence of  a spell of unemployment, are 
known to her. To a large extent this analysis should be considered an ex 
post evaluation of the program on the part of the woman. This ex post 
evaluation  ignores an important  feature of  income maintenance pro- 
grams: it insures the eligible population against reductions in their real 
standard of living. In the previous section, we  concluded that when a 
woman suffers a reduction in her standard of living due to a spell of unem- 
ployment, she places an  ex post value on  the income maintenance program 
equal to  the payment she receives. 
However, if  the woman could have found sufficient employment that 
made her ineligible for payments, ex post she would not place a value on 
the program. Obviously, ex post evaluations of income maintenance pro- 
grams do not capture the insurance aspects that an income maintenance 
program possesses. 
In order to  capture this insurance aspect, it is necessary to introduce un- 
certainty in the decision-making process of the woman. The question now 
becomes: What is the value the woman places on the existence of the pro- 
gram if she has a probability of becoming unemployed, even though she is 
currently employed and not receiving a payment? One possibility is to use 
the expected payment, i.e., the payment she would receive if she became 
unemployed times the probability of becoming unemployed.'  In this sec- 
tion we will show that this measure is likely to underestimate the value of 
the program to the woman. 
In order to analyze this proposition, we first need to introduce the con- 
cept of unemployment uncertainty into the above framework. We will as- 
sume that the woman with a probability, T,  will not be able to work any 
hours at wage rate, w.  She will, with a probability (1 -  T),  be able to work 
as many hours as she wishes at this same wage rate. Further, in order to 
simplify the analysis in this section, we assume a fairly restricted type of 
income maintenance program. If the woman is unable to work, she will re- 
ceive a payment of P  dollars from the government. However, she will re- 
ceive nothing if  she is empl~yed.~  Finally, we  assume that she has no 
sources of income other than earnings, i.e.,  Y will be equal to zero. 
The woman chooses her hours of work, h*, so as to maximize her ex- 
pected level of well-being. Formally, she chooses h* so as to maximize: 
EU = TU(~  7') + (1 -  a)U(wh, T -  h) . 
3. See Long 1967 for an example. See also Smeeding 1982 for alternative approaches to 
valuing in-kind transfers. 
4.  The structure  of  this program  resembles the unemployment  insurance program; it 
could also be considered a description of the program seen in equation (1) where the tax rate 
(t) is set high enough so that the individual would not participate in the program if she were 
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As Sjoquist (1976) has shown, the optimal choice of  labor supply to the 
above problem is the same as the optimal solution to the labor supply deci- 
sion under certainty, i.e., h*  will maximize U(wh,  T -  h). Thus the opti- 
mal amount of  labor supply for this problem will be solely a function of 
the wage rate (i.e., h*  = h(w)). 
Now let the expected utility in the absence of the income maintenance 
program be denoted by: 
EUo = rU(0,  T)  + (1 -  r)U(~h*,  T -  h*) ; 
and with the program be denoted by: 
EUi = TU(~  T)  + (1 - r)U(wh*,  T -  h*). 
The question we now raise is how does the woman value the gain in her ex- 
pected utility that the income maintenance program provides her? 
Burton Weisbrod, in a pathbreaking article (Weisbrod 1964; see also 
Cicchetti and Freeman  1971; Graham 1981) argued that the appropriate 
measure of  the woman’s valuation of  the program could be constructed 
by asking for the maximum certainty payment the woman would be will- 
ing to make to have the program in existence. He denoted this amount as 
the option price (OP).  Using our notation, the option price can be defined 
such that 
(6)  T U(P  - Oe  T)  + (1 -  r)U(wh* - OR  T -  h*) = EUo . 
As Graham (1981)  has shown, the option price is just one of  many 
measures one can utilize to measure the value of a program that insures 
the individual against some risk.5  An alternative benefit measure is the ex- 
pected surplus that the program yields. That is, if a given state occurs, the 
program yields a given amount of surplus to the individual. For each state 
this surplus can be measured by either the compensating variation or the 
equivalent variation discussed in the previous section. The expected sur- 
plus is then obtained by weighting the state-contingent surplus values by 
the probability that the state occurs. For example, in this section the woman 
receives no surplus if she is employed because she will not receive a pay- 
ment in this state. However, her surplus will be P  dollars if  she is unem- 
5. In this paper we have adopted as a measure of value the maximum certainty payment 
the individual would wish to make in order to have the program in existence. The use of the 
measure-the  option price-is  in keeping with the literature. However, upon further reflec- 
tion, we have concluded that a more appropriate measure in the case of an income mainte- 
nance program would be the minimum,certainty lump-sum payment the individual would re- 
quire in order to be indifferent to the program’s existence. When stated in this manner, we 
see that the option price is the uncertainty equivalent of  the compensating variation mea- 
sure, while the above alternative measure would have the equivalent variation as its certainty 
counterpart. If the relationship that exists between the compensating and equivalent vari- 
ation holds up in the uncertainty case, then the option price would underestimate the value 
of  the income maintenance program to the individual. Exploration of  this issue represents 
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ployed. Hence her expected surplus is UP,  which in this simple case is 
equal to her expected payments from the program. 
Following the literature, we  will  define the risk  premium a woman 
places upon an income maintenance program as the difference between 
the option price and the expected surplus, i.e., the risk premium, RP,  is 
equal to 
RP  = OP  -  ES, 
where ES is the expected surplus. Thus in the above example the risk pre- 
mium is equal to (OP - UP). 
7.3.1  Numerical Example 
If we  adopt the option price as our ex ante measure of the woman’s 
valuation of the program, then it remains to explore whether or not the 
option price will exceed the woman’s expected payment (expected surplus) 
from the program (TP).  As Schmalensee (1972) and Henry (1974) have 
shown, the option price depends upon the individual’s preferences and 
may or may not exceed the expected payment.6 
Thus, first we have to specify the woman’s preferences for income and 
leisure. One approach would be to specify a direct utility function, U(X, 
l),  and then to make some assumptions about the parameters of the func- 
tion. Our approach is different. We will assume a given labor supply func- 
tion and derive the implicit utility function from it. By  doing so we can 
take empirical estimates of labor supply functions that appear in the lit- 
erature as statements about the “average” woman’s preferences for in- 
come and leisure. In particular, we assume the linear labor supply func- 
tion 
(7)  h = 6 + aw + pr: 
where 6, a,  and @ are all constant parameters that may depend upon the 
individual’s demographic characteristics.  If  the labor supply function 
takes the above functional form, the expenditure function can be written 
as (Sheppard’s lemma): 
(8)  E(w, (I)  = (a  -  P(6 + aw))/p* + (Iexp(-pw); 
or in terms of the direct utility function: 
(9)  U(X,  h) = ((Oh -  a)/P2)  exp(P(6 + PX -  h)/(Ph -  a)).’ 
For the purposes of this paper, we chose to utilize the estimates of the lin- 
ear labor supply function from the Hausman study (Hausman 1981). In 
6.  In Appendix B, we derive a sufficient condition for the option price to exceed the ex- 
pected value of the payment. 
7.  It should be noted that the utility function for the linear labor supply function meets 
our sufficient conditions for OP  to exceed the expected payments from the program for all 
payments P  that are less than an amount roughly equal to $15,OOO per year. 223  Measuring the Benefits of Income Maintenance Programs 
Table 7.1  Values of Option Price (OP) and Risk Premium (RP) 
Computed from Equation (6) 
Wage Rate 
$3.00  $4.00  $5.00 
Probability of 
Unemployment  OP  RP  OP  RP  OP  RP 
0.90  $3,786  $186  $3,794  $194  $3,798  $198 
0.75  3,404  404  3,440  440  3,449  449 
0.50  2,680  610  2,680  701  2,698  698 
0.25  1,530  530  1,606  606  1,625  625 
0.10  681  281  727  327  738  338 
Source: Calculations by authors. 
Notes: Figures computed for a female head under forty-five years of age who has one 
child aged six. P  = $4,000. 
this study, Hausman has estimated that for female-headed households 
(i.e.,  households with children present and only one, female, adult), a 
equals 0.3509 while an average /3  is equal to -  0.122. The intercept term 
(6) in the Hausman study was made a function of several demographic 
characteristics such as age and family composition. For the numerical ex- 
ample in this paper, we chose a female who is less than forty-five-years- 
old and has one child under six years of age. A woman with these charac- 
teristics has a value of  6 of 1.0563. It should be noted that hours of work 
are measured in the Hausman study in terms of annual hours of work (in 
thousands), while Y is also measured in thousands of dollars per year. 
Finally, we chose to simulate a value of $4,000  for P-the  payment the 
woman would receive if  she became unemployed.  In order to examine 
how the risk premium and option price would vary for other parameters 
of the problem, we computed these variables utilizing various wage rates 
($3.00, $4.00,  and $5.00) and for various probabilities of becoming unem- 
ployed (0.10, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, and 0.90). The results of these computa- 
tions, using equation (6) and the above assumptions, appear in table 7.1. 
As the numbers in table 7.1 illustrate, the risk premium that a woman 
places upon an unemployment contingent payment of $4,000  can be quite 
large. As one would expect, the option price declines as the probability of 
unemployment declines. However the risk premium does not possess this 
same monotonic behavior. First, we note that the risk premium actually 
rises initially with a decline in the probability of unemployment and then 
starts to decline when the probability of unemployment falls below 50 per- 
cent.* Second, reading across table 7.1 we see that the risk premium rises 
with the wage rate of the woman holding the probability of unemploy- 
ment constant. 
8. While the risk premium shows an inverted U-shape pattern, the ratio of the risk premi- 
um to the expected surplus is monotonically increasing with the probability of employment. 
For a similar result, see Freeman 1984. 224  David Betson/Jacques van der Gaag 
Maybe the most important result of table 7.1 is that it illustrates the 
magnitude of the potential error one makes by using either the actual pay- 
ments received (ex post analysis), or the use of expected payment from the 
program as the program’s value to the household. To illustrate this, con- 
sider two women, one with a wage rate of $3.00 and 90 percent probability 
of  becoming unemployed (ex ante) and the other with a $5.00 wage rate 
and a 10 percent chance of becoming unemployed. For the sake of argu- 
ment let us assume that the low-wage woman becomes unemployed and 
the high-wage woman does not. Ex post considerations would indicate 
that the low-wage woman benefited by $4,000 from the program while the 
high-wage woman did not benefit at all. Using the expected payments 
from the program as a measure of the program’s benefits we would be led 
to say that the low-wage woman values the program at $3,600 and the 
high-wage woman at $400. However, as the calculations in table 7.1 indi- 
cate, either one of these measures will tend to impart different kinds of bi- 
ases into the measure of the value of the program to the individual women. 
For the low-wage woman who receives a payment, the use of the actual 
payment received ($4,000) overstates the value of  the program to her 
($3,786), while the use of the expected payment ($3,600) underestimates 
the value of the program because it ignores the risk premium. For the 
high-wage woman a different relationship emerges. Both the actual pay- 
ment (zero) and the expected payment ($400) underestimate the value of 
the program to her ($738). 
While there are differential effects on the two women, the results in the 
aggregate are clear. The total value the two women place upon the exis- 
tence of the program ($4,524) is 13 percent higher than the actual pay- 
ments (or the sum of the expected payments). The implications for the dis- 
tributional effects of the program are also quite clear. The use of  the 
actual payments would indicate that 100 percent of the total benefits are 
received by  the low-wage woman, while the use of the expected payments 
would indicate that 90  percent of the benefits of the program went to her. 
However, the use of the option price measure of value indicates that only 
84 percent of the total benefits would accrue to the low-wage woman. If 
the results of our example are indicative for the population as a whole, we 
have to conclude that the use of either the actual or the expected payment 
would overestimate the redistributive effects of income maintenance pro- 
grams such as the one we simulated in the above example, and will serve to 
underestimate the total benefits the group receives from the program. 
7.4  An Expanded Notion of  Uncertainty 
In the previous section we examined the extent to  which a woman would 
place a risk premium on her expected payments from a specific unemploy- 
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some admittedly simplifying assumptions. The most crucial one was the 
way in which we characterized employment uncertainty:  Previously, we 
assumed the woman faced only two states-employment  and the ability to 
work as much as she wishes at a prespecified wage rate that was known to 
her in advance, or unemployment. In this section we shall expand our con- 
cept of  uncertainty by treating the real wage as a random ~ariable.~  This 
implies a continuum of employment states with hours worked (and corre- 
sponding earnings) dependent upon this stochastic wage rate. We  shall 
also introduce a somewhat more realistic income maintenance program: 
the woman is now assumed to be eligible for payments as long as her in- 
come does not exceed a given level, regardless of her state of employment. 
Thus, this income maintenance program insures the women against a 
drop in her level of well-being due to unemployment or due to an unlucky 
draw from the distribution of wages. 
In order to measure the value that the woman places upon this insur- 
ance protection, we will need to modify equation (6) to reflect the uncer- 
tainty about the wage rate. First, let us assume that the woman possesses a 
subjective probability function over real wages, f(w).  Given that we  will 
continue to characterize employment uncertainty as a two-state occur- 
rence (employment at hours desired, given the stochastic wage rate, or no 
employment at all), we can modify equation (6) to define the option price, 
OP, such that 
(10)  EUI  = EUo, 
where 
EUo = TU(O,T)  + (1 -  T)  U(W~$,  T -  h$)f(w)dw  r  0 
with 




h? = the hours that maximize the expected utility when there is an income 
maintenance program, 
9. See Block and Heineke 1973 and Cowell 1981 for the treatment of wage uncertainty in 
the absence and presence of income maintenance programs respectively. 226  David BetsodJacques van der Gaag 
where 
G -  twh?  if  h?C G/tw, 
if  hfr  G/tw.  P*  ={  0 
Before turning to some numerical calculations of the value that a woman 
might place upon an income maintenance program given the above char- 
acterization of the environment, we wish to remind the reader that two 
important distinctions must be made between the numerical calculations 
below and the previous ones. First, in the previous example we considered 
only unemployment contingent payments.  In the current  example the 
woman will be eligible for a payment not only if she is unemployed but 
also if  she is employed and her earnings are less than G/t.  This “exten- 
sion” of the income maintenance program is, of course, likely to increase 
the option price significantly. Second, in the previous example the labor 
supply decision is made with no regard to the payment she would receive if 
she became unemployed. However, in the current example her decision of 
how much labor to supply will depend not only on the distribution of 
wages, but also on G and t, since she may be eligible for a payment if her 
real earnings fall below G/t. 
7.4.1  Numerical Example 
In order to compute numerical values for the option price and other 
variables of interest, the only additional concept that needs to be quanti- 
fied from our previous example is the distribution of real wage rates. We 
have assumed that wages are distributed normally. Note that the symme- 
try of the normal distribution implies that we  implicitly assume that the 
woman expects her potential real wage rate to remain unchanged. We 
choose three values for the mean of the distribution, corresponding to the 
wage rates utilized earlier: $3.00, $4.00  and $5.00. In all cases, we utilize a 
standard deviation of $.25. 
Table 7.2 presents the numerical values for the option value, expected 
surplus, expected payment, and risk premium a woman with one child 
would place upon an income maintenance program as described by equa- 
tion (l), where G is equal to $4,000 and t is equal to 0.50. The expected 
surplus presented in table 7.2 is defined to be the expected compensating 
variation, i.e., 
m 
ES = TG + (1 -  T)  lCV(w)f(w)d~, 
0 
where CV(w)  is such that 
U(wh?+ P* -  CV(W),  T -  h?) = U(Wh$,T -  ha 
for all w.  From the above definition of the expected surplus, we note that 
if h$is equal to h? ,  the compensating variation given a specific wage rate 
will be equal to the payment the woman receives. Hence if this condition is 
met, the expected surplus will be equal to the expected payment the woman 227  Measuring the Benefits of Income Maintenance Programs 
able  7.2  Values of  Option Price and Risk Premium 
Computed Using Equation (10) 
$3.00 Wage Rate 
Probability of 
Unemployment  OP  ES  EP  RP 
0.90  $3,834  $3,761  $3,830  $  73 
0.75  3,565  3,403  3,590  155 
0.50  3,014  2,807  3,179  207 
0.25  2,333  2,210  2,769  123 
0.10  1,831  1,803  2,522  28 
$4.00 Wage Rate 
Probability of 
Unemployment  OP  ES  EP  RP 
0.90  $3,795  $3,602  $3,602  $193 
0.75  3,441  3,006  3,006  435 
0.50  3,682  2,012  2,012  610 
0.25  1,607  1,018  1,018  589 
0.10  728  403  403  325 
Probability of  $5.00 Wage Rate 
Unemployment 
OP  ES  EP  RP 
0.90  $3,798  $3,600  $3,600  $198 
0.75  3,449  3  ,OOo  3  ,000  449 
0.50  2,690  2,000  2,000  698 
0.25  1,625  1,000  1,000  625 
0.10  738  400  400  338 
Source: Calculations made by authors. 
Notes: Figures computed for a female head undei forty-five years of age who has one 
child aged six. G = $4,000; t  = 0.50. 
receives. However, if hPis less than hzas we would expect in this example, 
then, as has been shown in section 7.2, the payment the woman receives 
will always exceed the compensating variation for all wage rates. Hence in 
the case where there is a labor supply reduction in response to the pro- 
gram, the expected payment will always exceed the expected surplus. Fi- 
nally, we would like to remind the reader that the risk premium is defined 
to be equal to the difference between the option price and the expected 
surplus. 
Let us begin by comparing the numerical values of the option price 
computed here with the ones in our previous example. As expected, the 
option prices in table 7.2 are much larger than those in table 7.1.  For in- 
stance, the option prices rose from $681 to $1,831 for a woman with an 
(expected) wage rate of $3.00 and a 10 percent probability of becoming 
unemployed.  The main cause of the increase in the value of  the option 
price is the extension of the program, which now provides a real-income 228  David Betson/Jacques van der Gaag 
floor even when employed. This, of course, is especially valuable for a 
woman with a low expected wage rate, since given her distribution of real 
wage rates she is most likely to  be eligible for payments from the program. 
For the women with a higher expected wage rate, the option prices calcu- 
lated in tables 7.1 and 7.2 are essentially the same because if these women 
are employed they have only a very small probability of receiving a pay- 
ment, due to their distribution of wages. 
As noted above, if a labor supply reduction occurs due to the program, 
the expected payments will exceed the expected surplus the woman re- 
ceives from the program. For the low-wage woman (the $3.00 expected 
wage rate case), the difference between the two concepts is significant and 
reflects the effects of a large labor supply reduction in the order of 30 per- 
cent. However, for the higher wage women there is no difference between 
these two concepts, reflecting the fact that for these women a reduction in 
their labor supply does not occur due to the program. 
From table 7.2 we note that the expected surplus never exceeds the op- 
tion price. Consequently, the risk premium is always positive. Also, the 
U-shaped pattern of risk premiums that was present in the earlier example 
is present in this example. 
While in general the calculations indicate that the relationships between 
the various concepts in this example are similar to those in the previous ex- 
ample, one major difference does appear. This difference is between the 
value of the option price and the expected payments. In the previous ex- 
ample, the option price always exceeded the expected payments to the 
women in all cases. However, for the low-wage woman, the expected pay- 
ment exceeds the option price in all cases except when the probability of 
unemployment is high. A rational for why this reversal occurs and why 
the difference widens as the probability of employment increases, eludes 
us at this time and is an area for further examination. 
The possibility that the expected payments exceed the option price for 
some cases in table 7.2 causes us to soften some of  our conclusions pre- 
sented in the previous example. Since the option price always exceeds the 
expected payments, we could conclude that use of either the actual pay- 
ments or expected payments would underestimate the aggregate value of 
the program. Further, either of these methods would tend to overestimate 
the redistribution that was accomplished by the program. While the sec- 
ond conclusion will remain, it should be noted that since it is possible that 
the expected payment exceeds the option price for low-wage-rate  women, 
it is possible in the aggregate that the payments made to individuals exceed 
the sum of individual option prices. 
7.5  Conclusions 
In this chapter we have examined the relationship between the payment 
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program that either transfers or potentially transfers income to the house- 
hold. In the case of certainty and with benefit payments only in the case of 
unemployment, we  concluded that the payment the household receives 
provides an upper bound to the value the household places upon the pro- 
gram. Using the option price as the “correct” measure of the value of the 
program, we showed that the expected value of the payment, i.e., the pay- 
ment times the probability of being unemployed, tends to underestimate 
the value of  the program to the population in general and to each house- 
hold individually. In the numerical examples presented, the risk premium, 
i.e.,  the  difference between  the expected value  and the option price, 
ranged  from  $1  86  for  a  low-wage/high-probability-of-unemployment 
woman, to $698 for a high-wage woman with a 50 percent probability of 
unemployment.  The corresponding values of the expected payments of 
the program were $3,600 and $2,000  respectively. Consequently, the use of 
expected payments as the value of the program to the households will 
overestimate the distributional impact of the program. 
We  then  discussed a more realistic case with wage rate uncertainty, 
where the program made payments to a woman as long as her earned in- 
come did not exceed a certain amount; Given that the program now in- 
sures against erosions in a household’s real income even when a woman is 
employed, it came as no surprise to find that for a woman with a low ex- 
pected wage rate, the option prices were even larger than in the first case. 
This was almost entirely the result of the extension of the program. For a 
woman facing a higher wage rate this extension had no effect on the op- 
tion price. To summarize our results somewhat differently: the difference 
between the value of expected payments and the option price is large for 
those cases where large behavioral responses to the program can be ex- 
pected. 
The methodology to measure the value of welfare programs, as devel- 
oped in this chapter, has a wide range of  applications.  In principle it is 
straightforward, once the option price is accepted as the value of the pro- 
gram. In order to calculate this option price, one needs information not 
only on what benefits are potentially available to the individual, but also 
on the distribution of real-wage rates, probability of unemployment, and 
the individual’s preferences over the various alternatives,  i.e.,  a utility 
function. While in principle the first three elements needed to compute the 
option price can be inferred from various data sources, the individual’s 
preferences are conceptually more difficult to specify. What we have dem- 
onstrated in this paper  is that  observations on labor  supply behavior 
can-through  Sheppard’s lemma-yield  such a utility function. 
We should stress, however, that our results are based on one labor sup- 
ply function (and thus one particular income-leisure preference ordering) 
only, as applied to a selected set of hypothetical households. As a next step 
in our research we need to analyze a “real” sample of household data (like 
a CPS), estimate various specifications of the labor supply function for 230  David BetsodJacques van der Gaag 
female heads, and use the observed distributions of the probability of un- 
employment and the wage rate to estimate the value of, say, AFDC or 
food stamp programs. As our examples indicate, the differences between 
the option price on the one hand and such commonly used measures as 
payment received or expected benefits on  the other hand, are large enough 
to warrant such a study, especially when the focus is on the distributional 
aspects of the program. 
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Appendix A 
Demonstration That the Income Maintenance 
Payment  Will Exceed the Traditional 
Benefit Measures 
In order to  show that the payment a woman receives from the program ex- 
ceeds either of the two benefit measures, we will first show that EVwill al- 
ways be as great as CK Using equations (3) and (5)  for EVand CK we can 
state that 
CVSEV 
if and only if 
>  E((l -  t)~,  VI) -  E((l -  t)~,  VO)?E(W,  VI) -  E(w,  VO); 
or equivalently, 
E((l - t)~,  VI)  -  E(w,  Vi)SE((l -  t)~,  Vo) -  E(w Vo). 
Because the woman is participating in the program,  Vl will exceed Vo.  If 
leisure is a normal good (i.e., the marginal utility of leisure is decreasing in 
/), then 
E((1 -  t)~,  VI)  -  E(w,  VI) I  E((1 -  t)~,  Vo) -  E(w,  Vo). 
Hence 
CVr  El.: 
Now we will demonstrate that the transfer the household receives from 
the program will exceed EK First, let the transfer be equal to  i.e., 
P = G -  tY -  twhl, 
where 
hl  = h((1 -  t)~,  G + (1 -  t)Y). 
Furthermore, from equation (4), 
EVZP 
if and only if 
G -  tY + E(w,  VI)  -  E((1 -  t)w VI)  5 G -  tY -  twhl, 
or equivalently, 
E(w, VI)  SE((1 - t)~,  VI)  -  twhi. 
In order to determine which condition will hold, first note that if  E(w,  U) 
is the Hicksian labor supply function, then 232  David Betson/Jacques van der Gaag 
hl* 6((l - t)w, V,). 
Next note that due to the derivative property of the expenditure function 
(Sheppard’s lemma), the derivation of  the expenditure function with re- 
spect to the wage is equal to  minus the Hicksian labor supply function, 
aE(w, U)/& = -h(w U)  . 
Because the expenditure function is concave in w, 
E(w, Vl) I  E((1 -  t)w, Vl) + tw(aE((1 - t)w, Vl)/aw) 
(this inequality is known as the Kiinus inequality), or equivalently, 
E(w Ui) I  E((1 -  t)~,  UI) -  twhi. 
Hence the payment P exceeds the equivalent variation measure of a wom- 
an’s gain in well-being caused by the existence of the income maintenance 
program. Since we have shown that EV will always exceed CK  this pay- 
ment will also exceed the compensating variation measure. 
Let us now define an alternative payment, PO,  which is the (hypotheti- 
cal) payment a woman would receive if  she worked the same number of 
hours under the program as she would in the absence of the program. Let 
Po  = G -  tY -  twho 
where 
ho  = h(w, y) . 
Now by the same line of argument as used above, we can demonstrate that 
Pol cv. 
Hence we can use the two payments, PO  and R to bound the appropriate 
benefit measures, i.e., 
POSCVIEVSP. 
Appendix B 
A Suflcient Condition for the Option Value to 
Exceed the Expected Payments from a Program 
While we have not been able to establish necessary and sufficient condi- 
tions for OP to exceed 7rR we have been able to establish a sufficient con- 
dition that we believe is likely and plausible. Formally, for the risk premi- 
um to be positive, the marginal utility of income at (1 - ?r)P  dollars of 233  Measuring the Benefits of Income Maintenance Programs 
income and T hours of leisure must exceed the marginal utility of income 
at wh* -  TP  dollars of income and T -  h*  hours of leisure. 
In order to  demonstrate this, note (from equation 6) that if the marginal 
utility of income (UX)  is positive for all Xand  I, then 
OP  > TP  if and only if 
rU((1 - ~)e  T)  + (1 -  a)U(wh* -  T-  h*) > EUo, 
which can be rewritten as 
OP  > TP  if and only if 
U(wh*,  T -  h*) -  U(wh* -  T -  h*)  >  Ir 
1-*  U((1 - *)e  7') - U(0,  7') 
Now due to the concavity of U 
T  P  U,y(wh* - TR  T -  h*) > U(wh*,  T -  h*) 
- U(wh* -  T -  h*) 
and 
(1 - r)PUx((l  -  T)E: 7') < U((1  - ~)e  T)  - U(0,  T)  . 
Thus 
U(wh*,  T -  h*) - U(Wh* -  T -  h*) 
u((1 -  - U(0,T) 
Hence if UX(wh* -  re  T -  h*)  is less than UX((1 -  T)E T) then the op- 
tion price will exceed the expected payment to a woman, rE?  While con- 
cavity of the utility function is not enough to  guarantee that the above suf- 
ficient condition will hold (note that concavity of the utility function is the 
same assumption as risk aversion), the examples in section 7.4 indicate 
that this condition is likely to  be met for reasonable values of e w, and ?r. 
It might prove useful to amplify the significance of the above result. Let 
us  consider a population of  N female-headed households each facing a 
prospect of becoming unemployed with probability ?r.  In any given year 
we would observe that TNof the women were unemployed and receiving P 
dollars; as presented above, each woman in the population would be will- 
ing to pay up to OP  dollars each year to have the program in existence. 
This means that N(OP)  dollars can be collected from the population. 
Thus if our sufficient condition is met, the women in the population will 
collectively value the program in excess of the payments that are made to 
the group. 234  David Betson/Jacques van der Gaag 
Comment  F. Thomas Juster 
The Betsodvan der Gaag chapter is concerned with assessing the conse- 
quences for the evaluation of income maintenance programs of introduc- 
ing uncertainty both about hours of work and real-wage rates. The chap- 
ter  has five  sections: the first is  an introduction,  the second examines 
valuation issues under conventional assumptions of no uncertainty, the 
third extends the valuation analysis to uncertainty about hours of work, 
the fourth extends the analysis further to uncertainty  about real-wage 
rates, and the fifth and last section provides a summary and discussion of 
policy implications. 
In section 7.2  the authors demonstrate that alternative measures of pro- 
gram benefits can be derived from a household utility function in which 
consumption  and  leisure  are the  arguments,  and  that  these  welfare- 
oriented benefit measures can be shown to lie between two observable 
benefit measures. One observable measure is the actual payments received 
by  a female head of household who participates  in an income mainte- 
nance program, such as AFDC or food stamps, which is shown to be an 
upper bound. The other is the payment that the woman would receive if 
she worked the same number of hours in the absence of the program as 
she chose to work, given the incentive structure contained by  the pro- 
gram, which is the lower bound. 
Two features of this analysis are worth noting. First, the two alternative 
welfare-oriented benefit measures, discussed in the literature as the com- 
pensating variation and the equivalent variation, require valuation mea- 
sures based  on questions that  are not  likely to be answerable in  any 
straightforward manner. The welfare measures are obtained from the an- 
swers to questions concerning counterfactual situations, and there is no 
reason to believe that people can provide useful answers to questions of 
that sort. Second, the analysis makes the conventional assumptions about 
utility functions-that  the arguments are consumption and leisure and 
that both are decreasing and positive throughout. 
In section 7.3 the analysis is extended to a situation where hours of 
work are uncertain because some probability, T,  of unemployment exists. 
Thus hours of  work equal either the preferred amount given the utility 
function and the opportunity set, or equal zero because of unemploy- 
ment. It is further assumed that those who become unemployed will par- 
ticipate in the program, while those who do not become unemployed will 
not be eligible for the program (it ensures only against uncertainty with re- 
spect to hours of work, not real income). 
F.  Thomas  Juster is director of the Institute for Social Research and professor of econom- 
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Given that model, the authors argue that the program can be evaluated 
by finding the maximum payment that those potentially eligible for the 
program would be willing to  make to  have the program in existence-this 
amount is defined as the option price (OP).  The remainder of this section 
explores the circumstances under which the option price can be expected 
to exceed the expected value of the payments to potential participants. 
The difference between the option price and the expected payment is de- 
fined as the risk premium-the  value of the hedge against uncertain hours 
represented by the program’s existence. 
Numerical estimates of  the risk premium are derived in the paper by 
specifying the parameters of a particular labor supply function, originally 
estimated for female-headed households with children present. The basic 
purpose of this exercise is to calculate the distributional consequences of 
the program by comparing the distribution of  option prices (which in- 
cludes risk premiums) with the distribution of  expected payments.  The 
conclusion is that existence of a program that hedges against uncertainty 
in work hours provides relatively more benefits to higher-wage workers 
with low probabilities of  becoming unemployed than would be inferred 
from observing the actual distribution of program payments. That is, the 
distribution of program benefits as measured by the option price suggests 
that more benefits would go to high-wage workers than would appear to 
be true from simply observing the distribution of actual payments. Thus a 
program that hedges against hours uncertainty will be less redistributive 
than a program in which hours uncertainty is absent. 
In the next section, the analysis of uncertainty effects is extended to 
cover uncertainty about real-wage rates. For this analysis the authors as- 
sume a normal distribution of real-wage expectations, with a standard de- 
viation of $1  .oO  per hour at alternative specified levels of the mean of that 
distribution. 
Working through the same kinds of  numerical example as used in the 
earlier section, the value of the program to potential participants as mea- 
sured by the estimated option price is substantially greater, especially for 
low-wage  workers with  relatively  low  probability of  becoming  unem- 
ployed. The reason is not that the hedge against real-wage uncertainty is 
especially valuable for these workers, but that the basic structure of the 
program is modified so that people who are employed at low-wage rates 
become eligible. Thus the substantial increase in the value of the program 
for some categories of  workers is not a consequence of wage-rate uncer- 
tainty, but occurs because low-wage workers are covered by the program 
even if they are employed, while in the analysis in the previous section, 
coverage was contingent on becoming unemployed. 
It should be noted that the higher option prices for most workers in the 
hypothetical examples provided are seriously overstated because of the as- 236  David Betson/Jacques van der Gaag 
sumptions about real-wage uncertainty. A standard deviation of $1  .OO 
with an expected mean of  $3.00, $5.00, or $7.00 implies an enormous 
amount of real-wage uncertainty relative to what one would expect to find 
in the real world. The authors are not talking here about real-wage uncer- 
tainty as reflected by what kind of job people might be able to obtain, but 
simply about uncertainty as reflected by the difference between rates of 
price inflation and rates of inflation in nominal wage rates. Uncertainty 
of this sort is in fact trivial in quantitative terms: under extreme condi- 
tions one might visualize a rate of price inflation of 10 percent associated 
with stability in nominal wages, hence a real wage cut of 10 percent. But 
that would imply a standard deviation of expected real-wage rates that 
would be much smaller than any of the numerical examples used in the pa- 
per, hence the real-wage effect is seriously exaggerated in the calculations 
that are shown by the authors. 
The principal difficulties with the paper are twofold. First, the calcula- 
tions are not carried out on a real sample of the U.S.  population, thus pro- 
viding the reader with an assessment of the distributional consequences  of 
these uncertainty considerations by using data that represent the right pro- 
portions of individuals with different wage rates, different employment/ 
unemployment experiences, different serial correlation properties in the 
incidence of unemployment, and so on. In the real world, just how much 
consideration of the uncertainty issue would modify the distribution of 
benefits as reflected by the distribution of  actual payments is not at all 
clear from the paper, although I would guess that the two distributions 
would not differ  very much from each other. Since the main concern of the 
paper is the effect on the benefit distribution of taking account of both 
hours and wage-rate uncertainty, the importance of these considerations 
cannot really be assessed without applying the model to real distributions. 
There are of course numerous bodies of data on which such a calculation 
could be made. 
The more serious problems with the paper are less easily fixed. The au- 
thors use a conventional welfare function in which utility is a function of 
income and leisure. Unemployment affects that welfare function in two 
ways: by increasing the amount of (valuable) leisure time, which in the 
model augments welfare, and by reducing income, which lowers welfare. 
The latter effect is stronger, hence welfare is reduced on balance. While 
there may be population elements where the increased leisure resulting 
from unemployment is a welfare-enhancing element, substantial evidence 
exists in the psychological literature that there are population elements 
where increased leisure of this form does not create any welfare enhance- 
ment at all, and in fact may reduce the value of leisure time generally. 
Aside from the long-term consequences of unemployment for conven- 
tional human capital theory, parts of the population probably assess un- 
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over and above the real income loss. The principal point I would make is 
that imposing the same utility function on everyone may not be very good 
social science, and may be seriously misleading when it comes to analysis 
of the utility attached to  various programs. 
The notion that the utility from being unemployed cannot be well repre- 
sented by seeing it as simply an increase in leisure time is reflective of a 
more general issue related to the usual form of utility functions in the eco- 
nomic literature. Specifying the utility function as a combination of  in- 
come plus leisure really amounts to  the view that utility is produced by the 
combination of extrinsic rewards from one kind of activity (work for pay 
in the market), plus intrinsic rewards from other activities (leisure). But 
work for pay may also carry intrinsic rewards, and the conventional model 
simply suggests that they are fully accounted for in the equilibrium choice 
between work  and leisure-the  marginal intrinsic rewards attached to 
work being part of the utility obtained from the last hour worked. 
The available literature here is concerned with the existence of compen- 
sating wage differentials, which equate the mixture of extrinsic and intrin- 
sic rewards from various types of work by providing monetary offsets to 
any intrinsic rewards differential. Attempts to test that idea have not been 
notably successful (see Duncan and Holmlund 1983), although some evi- 
dence exists that particular kinds of intrinsic differences in work situa- 
tions are associated with monetary wage differentials. 
More generally, recent data obtained in conjunction with research on 
nonmarket activities have turned up some results that may be fundamen- 
tally inconsistent with much of the conventional utility function literature 
(see Juster, forthcoming; Dow and Juster, forthcoming). As part of a data 
base focused on the nonmarket activities of households, we obtained di- 
rect measurements of intrinsic rewards (not at the margin, but on aver- 
age), for a variety of activities that included leisure, work for pay, and 
work in the home. Conventional utility theory would suggest that these in- 
trinsic satisfaction data should show that leisure outranks work and that 
interesting, challenging, and pleasant jobs outrank dull, routine, and dis- 
tasteful jobs. But the data do not show these patterns: work outranks lei- 
sure with respect to  intrinsic satisfactions, and that result is not due to the 
fact that the intrinsic satisfaction measures for work represent a mixture 
of  intrinsic and extrinsic rewards.  Jobs of  all sorts appear to provide 
about the same level of intrinsic satisfactions. 
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